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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WYMAN V. JAMES: NEW
RESTRICTIONS PLACED UPON THE
INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT
TO PRIVACY
Barbara James, a resident of New York City, applied for AFDC as-
sistance shortly before the birth of her son, Maurice, in May, 1967.
After a caseworker visited her home without any objection on her part,
welfare assistance was authorized. Two years later, a caseworker wrote
to Mrs. James, informing her that she would visit her home on May 14,
1969. Upon receipt of this notification, Mrs. James telephoned the work-
er, indicating that although she was willing to supply information which
was reasonable and relevant to her need for public assistance, no inter-
view would take place in her home. The caseworker then informed
Mrs. James that she was required by state law to visit in her home and
that her refusal to permit the visit would result in the termination of as-
sistance. Permission was still denied. On May 13, 1969, the City De-
partment of Social Services sent Mrs. James a notice of intent to discon-
tinue assistance because of the visitation refusal, which advised the aid
recipient of her right to a hearing before an administrative review officer.
At the requested hearing, Mrs. James reasserted her position, and the
review officer ruled that her refusal was a proper ground for the termina-
tion of assistance. A notice of termination was issued on June 2, 1969.
Thereupon, without seeking a hearing at the state level, Mrs. James,
acting individually and on behalf of her son, and purporting to act on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated, filed suit for declaratory and
injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Act,' alleging a denial of rights
guaranteed to her under the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, ninth, tenth,
and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution and under subchapters
IV and XVI of the Social Security Act. 2 She further alleged that she and
her son had no income, resources, or support other than the benefits re-
ceived under the AFDC program. On June 13, 1969, a divided three
judge district court held the relevant New York Social Welfare statute
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq. (1964).
2. Social Security Act, ch. 531, tit. IV, XVI, 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended
42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1970).
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and regulations invalid and unconstitutional in application.3 The United
States Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the :"home visit," as struc-
tured by the New York statutes and. regulations, is a reasonable adminis-
trative tool, which serves a valid and proper purpose for the dispensation
of the AFDC program and does not. present an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy prohibited by the fourth amendment. Wyman v. James,
400 U.S. 309 (1971).
This decision is significant because it indicates that the Supreme Court
considers the public welfare "hdme Visit" an exception to the general
search warrant requirement, which necessitates the securing of a warrant
for administrative searches. and seizures.4 The purpose of this casenote
is to demonstrate how Wyman obscures* the development of a prior dis-
tinct trend away from a property-criminal law concept in favor of a right
of privacy standard, as the primary basis in the adjudication of an indi-
vidual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as set
forth in the fourth amendment; to evaluate the evolution of the concept
which proposes that any s6arch is unreasonable per se, if it is conducted
prior' to securing a warrant from a neutral 'magistrate; and to analyze
critically the apparent resurrection of the "right-privilege" distinction in
the welfare area by the Wyman decision.
Under the Social Security Act, public welfare assistance is distributed
to four major categories: Aid to the Blind,5 Old Age Assistance,0 Aid to
the Permanently and Totally Disabled, 7 and Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children.8  Under the Act, each state has the power to adminis-
ter its welfare programs, funded in part by grants-in-aid from the federal
government. In order to become eligible for the federal grants, a state's
welfare plan must be approved by the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare." It must also meet certain fundamental requirements un-
der the Social Security Act, 10 and it must conform to the rules and regula-
3. James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The New York
Social Welfare statute and regulations that were adjudicated unconstitutional in ap-
plication were: N.Y. SOCIAL WELFARE LAW § 134 (McKinney 1966); N.Y. POLI-
CIES GOVERNING THE ADMINISTRATION OF. PUBLIC ASSISTANCE § 175 ( );
and TITLE 18 OF THE NEW YORK ,CODE OF RULES AND REGULATIONS [hereinafter
18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 351.10, 351.21 ( )].
4. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 310-26(1971).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-06 (1964).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06 (1964).
7. 42 U.S.C.§§ 1351-55 (1964).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1970).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 604 (1964).
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tions promulgated by the Secretary. 11
The primary purpose or concern of the categorical welfare assistance
program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), is the care
of the dependent child. 12 Therefore, the maintenance of an appropriate
atmosphere in the child's home by his relative (the aid recipient) is very
relevant to the proper administration of the AFDC program.' 3  The aid
recipient must sustain the proper conditions in the child's home in order
to preserve his continued eligibility to receive welfare benefits. 14  The
"home visit" is one of the primary aids which may be used by the state
welfare agency to ascertain whether or not the recipient is maintaining
the proper atmosphere in the child's dwelling. The aid recipient, himself,
is the primary source of eligibility information during the home inter-
views.15 Collateral contacts cannot be made for verification of eligibility
without the aid recipient's consent or knowledge.' 6 Nor are the case-
11. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, pt. IV, §§ 6200-6400 ( ) [hereinafter cited as
HANDBOOK]. See Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Evidentiary Hearing Re-
quired Prior To Termination of Welfare Benefits, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 552, 553
(1970).
12. "For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own
homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial as-
sistance and rehabilitation and other services . . . to needy dependent children and
the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen
family life...." 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
13. "[A]s (it) may be necessary in the light of the particular home conditions
and other needs of such child, relative, and individual, in order to assist such
child, relative and individual to attain or retain capability for self-support and
care and in order to maintain and strengthen family life and to foster child develop-
ment." 42 U.S.C. § 602(D) (14) (1970). Cf. HANDBOOK, Pt. IV, § 3452(10)
). This HEW regulation indicates that the assessment of foster care is to be
evaluated by viewing "total parental functioning and home conditions upon the
child."
14. "Whenever the State agency has reason to believe that any payments of aid
* made with respect to a child are not being or may not be used in the best
interests of the child, the State agency may provide for such counseling and guidance
services with respect to the use of such payments and the management of other
funds by the relative . . . in order to assure use of such payments in the best in-
terests of such child, and may provide for advising such relative that continued
failure to so use such payments will result in substitution therefore of protective
payments . . . or in seeking appointment of a guardian or legal representative
... or in the imposition of criminal or civil penalties authorized under State
Law. ... (emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. § 605 (1970).
15. HANDBOOK, pt. IV, § 2220(E)(1) ( ). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 606(A) (1970).
This indicates that there must be verification of the actual residence or actual phy-
sical presence of the child in the home.
16. HANDBOOK, pt. IV, § 2300(E)(2) ( ). Collateral contacts include
seeking information from schools, family doctors, hospitals, social agencies, and sim-
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worker's interviewing procedures to violate the constitutional rights of the
aid recipient during the home visit.' 7 Further, a case worker may not enter
a home by force, without permission, or under false pretenses.' 8 The fed-
eral regulations require only periodic redeterminations of welfare eligi-
bility,' 9 but the regulations also require verification of eligibility by mak-
ing field investigations, including home visits, in a selected sample of
cases.20 However, neither the Social Security Act nor the HEW rules
and regulations require mandatory home visits for the verification of an
aid recipient's initial or continuing eligibility for welfare benefits.
Because the establishment of standards for individual need and eligi-
bility of aid recipients is delegated to the states under the federal welfare
rules and regulations, many states require obligatory "home visits" for the
verification of a recipient's initial and continued welfare eligibility, even
though such mandatory investigations are not required by the Social Se-
curity Act or the regulations of the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare. 2 1  For example, in Wisconsin, whenever the regional state wel-
fare director receives a notification of the dependency of a child or an ap-
plication for assistance, a prompt investigation, including a home visit,
ilar resources. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.6, 351.7 ( ). See Brief for Appellant,
at 28, Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
17. HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 2200(A) ( ). "[Tihe policies and procedures for
taking applications and determining eligibility for assistance or other services . . .
will not result in practices that violate the individual's privacy or personal dignity,
or harass him, or violate his constitutional rights."
18. "The (state welfare) agency especially guards against violation of legal
rights and common decencies in such areas as entering a home by force, or without
permission, or under false pretenses; making home visits outside of working hours,
and particularly making such visits during sleeping hours and searching in the
home, for example, in rooms, closets, drawers or papers, to seek clues to possible
deception." HANDBOOK, pt. IV, § 2300(A) (
19. HANDBOOK, pt. IV, § 2200(D) ( ).
20. HANDBOOK, pt. II, § 6200(A) ( ).
21. The "home visit" is an established routine for verification of initial and
continuing eligibility in many states. See, e.g., ALA., MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRA-
TION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, pt. I-8(B), (1968 rev.); ARIz., REGULATIONS PROMUL-
GATED PURSUANT TO REVISED STATUTE § 46-203, Reg. 3-203.6 (1968); CAL. STATE
DEPT. OF SOCIAL WELFARE HANDBOOK, § C-012.50 (1964); GA. DIVISION OF
SOCIAL ADMINISTRATION-PUBLIC ASSISTANCE MANUAL, Part III, § V(D)(2), Part
VIII, § (A)(1)(b) (1969); MICH. PUBLIC ASSISTANCE MANUAL, Item 243 (3)(F)
(Rev. 1967); Mo. PUBLIC ASSISTANCE MANUAL, DEPT. OF WELFARE, § III (1969);
NEB., STATE PLAN AND MANUAL REGULATIONS, Part IX, §§ 5760, 5771 ( );
N.J., MANUAL OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Part II, §
2120, 2122 (1969); N.M., HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT MANUAL,§§ 211.5, 272.11 ( ); S.C., DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL, Vol. IV(D)(2)
); TENN. PUBLIC ASSISTANCE MANUAL, Vol. 2 (1968 rev.); Brief for Ap-
pellant, at 24, Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
of the circumstances concerning the child must be made before an initial
welfare grant can be given. 22  A written report describing this initial
home visit is made by the caseworker and it becomes part of the perma-
nent record in the case. In Illinois, a periodic home visit must be made
to each aid recipient, every four months, in order to verify continued wel-
fare eligibility. 23 The purpose of this periodic visit is "to ascertain con-
tinuing need for such aid and to provide the child and his parents or rela-
tives with such service and guidance as will strengthen family life. .... -24
At the time the suit was filed in Wyman, the New York social welfare
statutes and regulations conformed to the basic federal guidelines con-
cerning the purpose of the AFDC program and the limitations set upon
the scope of the "home visit" investigation. 5 However, the state statutes
and regulations dictated that verification of an aid recipient's initial and
continuing eligibility for welfare benefits could only be determined by
mandatory "home Visits. ' ' 2 6 Furthermore, the interview of the recipient
22. WIs. STAT. § 49.19(2) (1957); TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1955).
23. 'The home of each family receiving aid shall be visited at least once in
each four month period .... ." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 4-7 (1971); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 14-315 (1955). See IND. STAT. § 52-1247 (1964).
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 4-7 (1971).
25. New York State has adopted federal policy by making the dependent child
the primary concern of its social welfare program. "A child or minor shall be
considered to be eligible for ADC if his home situation is one in which his physi-
cal, mental and moral well-being will be safeguarded and his religious faith pre-
served and protected. . . . In determining the ability of a parent or relative to
care for the child so that this purpose is achieved, the home shall be judged by
the same standards as are applied to self-maintaining families in the community.
When, at the time of application, a home does not meet the usual standards of
health and decency but the welfare of the child is not endangered, ADC shall be
granted and defined services provided in an effort to improve the situation. Where
appropriate, consultation or direct service shall be requested ....... 18 N.Y.
C.R.R. § 369.2(C) ( ); N.Y. SOCIAL WELFARE LAW § 348-350, 353-354
(McKinney 1966). The importance of the well-being of the child is indicated by:
"The fact that the welfare of the child is being safeguarded shall be confirmed at
each regular contact with the family and as part of the periodic redetermination of
eligibility .... ." 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 369.4(B)(1) ( ). Like the federal guide-
lines, the aid recipient is also the primary source of information during the "home
visit" in New York. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.6 ( ). In addition, collateral
contacts cannot be made without the consent or knowledge of the recipient in New
York. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.6, 351.7 ( ). The caseworker also may not
violate the aid recipient's constitutional rights during the home interview. 18 N.Y.
C.R.R. § 351.7 ( ). Finally, the New York caseworker cannot enter a home by
force or without permission. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.1(d) ( ).
26. "The public welfare officials responsible . . . for investigating any applica-
tion for public assistance and care, shall maintain close contact with persons granted
public assistance and care. Such persons shall be visited as frequently as is pro-
vided by the rules of the board and/or regulations of the department or required
by the circumstances of the case, in order that any treatment or service tending to
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by the caseworker had to take place in the child's home and could not
be conducted elsewhere. Also, the home visit had to be made periodi-
cally every three months to verify continued welfare eligibility. 27 Finally,
the caseworker was bound to report any act of welfare fraud or misrepre-
sentation that he observed during the home visit. 28 Therefore, under
New York Social Welfare law, an aid recipient's refusal to allow a case-
worker into his house to conduct a home visit, would result in the auto-
matic termination of his welfare benefits.
The central issue raised in Wyman is the constitutionality of the state's
requirement of a mandatory home visit to verify initial and continued
welfare eligibility under the fourth amendment. This fundamental issue
can be resolved only after the determination of three controlling ques-
tions: (1) Are the home visits required by the Department of Social Ser-
vices in connection with the investigation of initial and continuing welfare
eligibility searches within the meaning of the fourth amendment; (2) if
the home visits are searches, does the failure on the part of the case-
worker to secure a search warrant from a judicial magistrate, prior to
conducting the investigation, render the home visit an unreasonable search
restore such persons to a condition of self-support and to relieve their distress
may be rendered and in order that assistance or care may be given only in such
amount and as long as necessary. . . . The circumstances of a person receiving
continued care shall be reinvestigated as frequently as the rules of the board or regu-
lations of the department may require." N.Y. SOCIAL WELFARE LAW § 134
(McKinney 1966). "Required Home Visits and Contacts. Social investigation
as defined and described . . . shall be made of each application or reapplication
for public assistance or care as the basis for determination of initial eligibility.
(a) Determination of initial eligibility shall include contact with the applicant and at
least one home visit which shall be made promptly in accordance with agency
policy...." 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.10 ( ).
27. "Mandatory visits must be made in accordance with law that requires that
persons be visited at least once every three months if they are receiving Home Re-
lief, Veterans Assistance, or Aid to Dependent Children, and at least once every
six months if they are receiving Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Disabled or
Assistance to the Blind." Policies Governing the Administration of Public Assist-
ance § 175( ).
28. "Any person who by means of a false statement or representation, or by
deliberate concealment of any material fact, or by impersonation or other fraudu-
lent device, obtains or attempts to obtain. . . . public assistance or care to which
he is not entitled, . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, unless such act constitutes
a violation of a provision of the penal law of the state of New York, in which
case he shall be punished in accordance with the penalties fixed by such law. ...
Whenever a public welfare official has reason to believe that any person has vio-
lated any provision of this section, he shall refer the facts and evidence available
to him to the appropriate district attorney or other prosecuting official." N.Y.
SOCIAL WELFARE LAw § 145 (McKinney 1966); (emphasis added). See People v.
Green, 36 Misc. 2d 888, 232 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Oneida County Ct. 1962); People v. La-
Face, 148 Misc. 238, 266 N.Y.S. 458 (Westchester County Ct. 1933).
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under the fourth amendment; and (3) if (1) and (2) are answered in
the affirmative, may the state condition the initial and continuing receipt
of AFDC benefits upon a waiver of the right to be free from an unreason-
able search as embodied in the fourth amendment? 2
9
In determining whether the home visit is a search within the meaning
of the fourth amendment, one must first determine whether the adjudica-
tion of a person's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
should be viewed from the old property-criminal law standard or the
modern framework of the right of privacy. In 1765, the English case,30
Entick v. Carrington,'1 signaled the first development in English law of a
right which protects a person from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Under the authorization of a general warrant issued by the secretary of
state, the defendants broke into Entick's home without his permission and
remained there for four hours.3 2 During their intrusion, they broke open
29. U. S. Const. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized." (emphasis added).
30. Mr. Justice Bradley pointed out the impact of this case on the development
of American law: "Lord Camden pronounced the judgment . . . and the law as ex-
pounded by him, has been regarded ...as one of the landmarks of English liberty.
It was welcomed and applauded by the lovers of liberty in the Colonies as well as
in the mother country ...as every American statesman, during our revolutionary
and formative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this monument of
English freedom, . . . it may be confidently asserted that its propositions were in
the minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and
were considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable
searches and seizures." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1886).
(emphasis added).
31. [1765] 19 Howell State Trials 1029.
32. During the period of 1762 to 1766, when the House of Commons passed
resolutions condemning the general warrants, John Wilkes attacked these abuses
through his pamphlet, The North Briton. Number 45 was very defiant in its denun-
ciation of the government and was declared libelous. By the authority of the secre-
tary of state's general warrant, Wilkes' house was searched and his papers were in-
descriminately seized. For this violation of his right to privacy, he sued the per-
petrators. Wilkes obtained a judgment of £4,000 in damages against the secretary of
state, Lord Halifax and £1,000 in damages against Wood, one of the searchers.
Wilkes' Case [1763] 19 Howell State Trials 982. See Leach v. Money [1765] 19
Howell State Trials 1001.
In this case, Entick was suspected of being one of the authors of The North Briton
and once again Lord Halifax issued the warrant. In America, the counterpoint to
the general warrants in England, were the Writs of Assistance, which empowered
revenue officers to search suspected places for smuggled goods at their discretion.
James Otis described the Writs of Assistance as "the worst instrument of arbitrary
power, the most destructive of English liberty and fundamental principles of law,
." because they placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty
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and examined the plaintiff's chests, drawers and private papers. In con-
demning this general search the court stated:
A power to issue such a warrant as this is contrary to the genius of the law of Eng-
land; ... It is the publishing of a libel which is the crime, and not the having it
locked up in a private drawer in a man's study. But if having it in one's custody was
the crime, no power can lawfully break into a man's house and study to search for
evidence against him. This would be worse than the Spanish inquisition; for ran-
sacking a man's secret drawers ...to come at evidence against him is like racking
his body to come at his secret thoughts.33
However, Lord Camden described Entick's right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures in terms of a property concept:
The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property.
That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances, where it has not
been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole . . . By
the laws of England, every invasion of private property be it ever so minute, is a
trespass. 34
Thus, in England, constitutional protection was given to the individual's
right against unreasonable searches and seizures of person or property,
but was granted in terms of a property concept, e.g., as protection
against trespass.35
In 1886, Boyd v. United States36 began a similar trend in American
law towards the use of property-criminal law standard in the determina-
tion of an individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and
officer." The famous Boston debate in February, 1761, which denounced the Writs
of Assistance was probably the most significant occurrence in a series of events
that initiated the resistance of the colonies against England. In describing the de-
bate, John Adams asserted: "Then and there was the first scene of the first act
of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the Child
Independence was Born." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886); TU-
DOR LIFE OF JAMES OTIS 61, 66 (1823).
33. [1765] 19 Howell State Trials at 1038. The elder Pitt also protested against
invasion of privacy by the police: "The poorest man may in his cottage bid de-
fiance to all the force of the Crown. It may be frail-its roof may shake-the wind
may blow through it-the storm may enter, the rain may enter-but the King of
England cannot enter-all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement!" 15 HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1307 (1753-1765).
34. [1765] 19 Howell State Trials at 1066. Lord Camden, also introduced a
criminal law concept in his description of the plaintiffs right of privacy: "It is
very certain, that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the necessary
means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the
guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it should seem, that search for evidence
is disallowed upon the same principle." Id. at 1073.
35. McKay, The Right of Privacy: Emanations And Intimations, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 259, 272 (1965).
36. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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seizures.37 The defendants imported thirty-five cases of plate glass into
the United States at the port of New York. Under a customs law, which
prohibited the use of any invoice to defraud the United States government
of its just duties, the District Attorney procured a subpoena for the de-
fendants' records. The law also provided that if any defendant failed to
produce the records, named in the subpoena, judgment was confessed
against them. The defendants contended that the customs law was un-
constitutional because it required the mandatory production of the in-
voices, which might be self-incriminating. In describing the defendants'
right of privacy, Mr. Justice Bradley referred to Lord Camden's decision
in Entick.
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional lib-
erty and security . . . They apply to all invasions on the part of the government
and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not
the breaking of his doors, ... that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is
the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private
property, . . it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes
the essence of Lord Camden's judgment.3 8
However, in analyzing the defendants' right of privacy in connection
with the compulsory production of self-incriminating records, the Court
introduced a criminal law rationale:
Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggrava-
tion; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony, or of his
private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his goods,
is within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the fourth and fifth
amendments run almost into each other.
39
37. The first American case to recognize privacy as a legally protected inter-
est was DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881). The state court
allowed recovery against a physician who permitted a non-professional man to assist
him at childbirth. The plaintiff granted permission for the assistant to enter her
home on the false assumption that he was a medical doctor. In describing the
plaintiff's right to privacy, the court stated: "To the plaintiff the occasion was a
most sacred one and no one had a right to intrude unless invited or because of
some real and pressing necessity which it is not pretended existed in this case.
The plaintiff had a legal right to the privacy of her apartment at such time, and
the law secures to her this right by requiring others to observe it, and to abstain
from its violation." 46 Mich. at 165-66, 9 N.W. at 149 (1881) (emphasis added).
See BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 393 (1969).
38. 116 U.S. at 630. (emphasis added). It should be noted that this description
seems to be based on an abstract view of privacy, rather than a property rationale.
Mr. Justice Bradley develops the idea more extensively: "It may be that it is the
obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and un-
constitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely; by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only
be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security
of person and property should be liberally construed." Id. at 635. See Entick
V. Carrington, [1765] 19 Howell State Trials at 1067.
39. 116 U.S. at 630.
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Therefore, prior to 1900 in the United States, the individual's right of
privacy had been successfully invoked although only in the context of
protection against unreasonable search and seizure of persons or tangible
property.40 But, because of the intermingling of the fourth and fifth
amendments in Boyd, an additional limitation on the scope of the right
to privacy began to develop. This limitation was that the fourth amend-
ment prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures only when the object
of the search was criminal evidence. 41 Therefore, there was no individual
right of privacy to protect a person from a purely administrative search,
which was unreasonable. Although subsequent cases discredited this
limitation on the right of privacy, 42 it persisted until 1967.
40. See notes 33, 35. However, in 1890 the Warren-Brandeis Law Review arti-
cle on privacy was published. The authors examined the problem of the unwarranted
publishing of private matters and discussed various cases in which relief was granted
on the grounds of implied contract, defamation, property right or breach of trust.
They concluded that these remedies were inadequate and that a new abstract concept
of privacy should be developed to replace them.
"That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a
principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from time to
time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, so-
cial, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights. . . . Thus, in
very early times, the law gave a remedy only for physical interference with life and
property, for trespasses vi et armis. . . . Liberty meant freedom from actual re-
straint; and the right to property secured to the individual. . . . Later, there came
a recognition of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect .. . grad-
ually the scope of these legal rights broadened; and now the right to life has come
to mean the right to enjoy life,-the right to be let alone; the right to liberty se-
cures the exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the term 'property' has grown
to comprise every form of possession-intangible, as well as tangible." Warren
and Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). See Ludwig,
"Peace of Mind" in 48 Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32 MINN. L. REV. 734
(1948); BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 393-94 (1969).
41. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), overruled, Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
42. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); Go-Bart Importing
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931). The Court in Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1906), declared that "Subsequent cases treat the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments as quite distinct, having different histories, and performing separate
functions." 201 U.S. at 72 (1906). In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920), the Court held that rights of a corporation against
unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if it be not protected by the
Fifth Amendment from compulsory production of incriminating documents. In
Nueslin v. District of Columbia, 115 F. 2d 690 (C.A.D.C. 1940), Associate Jus-
tice Vinson gave the clearest answer as to how to treat the problem: "Although
the IVth Amendment was written against the background of the general warrants
in England and the writs of assistance in the American colonies .. . history is re-
plete with instances of hasty overgeneralizations, thought to be fundamental truths,
drawn from the solution of a particular problem, we must regard CONSTITUTIONAL
provisions as more generic and more organic than other law with which we deal.
"The IVth and Vth Amendments relate to different issues, but cases can present
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The evolution of this theory has been most evident in the wiretapping
and eavesdropping cases. In Olmstead v. United States,48 the Supreme
Court held that "intangible" messages, concerning a conspiracy to violate
the National Prohibition Act, were not within the fourth amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. In reaching this
decision, Mr. Justice Taft emphasized the property characteristics of the
amendment's protective reach:
The amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things-the person,
the house, his papers, or his effects. The description of the warrant necessary to
make the proceeding lawful is that it must specify the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized. . . . The language of the amendment cannot be ex-
tended and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world from
the defendant's house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or
office, any more than are the highways along which they are stretched. 4 4
Although the majority of the Court decided to adhere to a property ra-
tionale in adjudicating an individual's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures in wiretapping cases, Mr. Justice Brandeis objected
strongly to this limited doctrine in his dissent:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pur-
suit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. . . . They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intru-
sion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means em-
ployed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.4 5
Mr. Justice Brandeis thus propounded a more abstract standard for the
facts which make the considerations behind these Amendments overlap." 115
F.2d at 692-93 (C.A.D.C. 1940).
Some of the cases which produce the overlapping effect are: Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 311 (1921);
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925). See also I. J. ELLIOT, THE DE-
BATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 328 (2d ed. 1937); 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES, Id. at 244 (2d ed. 1937);
MASS. CONST. art. XIV (1932); VA. CONST. art. X (1814). See generally Breard
v. City of Alexandria, La., 341 U.S. 622, 649 (1951) (Black and Douglas, J.J.,
dissenting); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 107 (1959) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
43. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352
(1967).
44. Id. at 464-65. Similarly in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967), the Supreme
Court held that the placing of a detectophone outside an individual's office did not
violate the fourth amendment because there was no physical invasion of the defend-
ant's property. Because there was no physical trespass committed by the police
officer, there was no violation of the defendant's right of privacy.
45. 277 U.S. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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individual's right of privacy in order to eliminate the strict limitation of
the property rationale. Even though his view was not accepted by the
Supreme Court until the latter part of the 1960's, it was often asserted in
the dissenting opinions of many important decisions. 46  As late as 1961,
47
the Supreme Court clung to a property concept as the primary standard in
the determination of whether or not an unreasonable search and seizure
46. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343
U.S. 451, 467 (1952), stated: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more
than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well,
if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the be-
ginning of all freedom. . . . It gives the guarantee that a man's home is his castle
beyond invasion either by inquisitive or by officious people." 343 U.S. at 467 (1952)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Harlan also proposed a more abstract privacy
standard in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961): "This 'liberty' is not a series of
isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of
speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from un-
reasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which
broadly speaking includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints .... ." 367 U.S. at 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See
generally Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 570
(1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
47. In On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), the Supreme Court held
that evidence obtained by having an undercover agent, rigged with a secret micro-
phone, engage the defendant in incriminating conversation was not obtained by un-
reasonable search and seizure and was admissible. Mr. Justice Jackson gave the
Court's rationale: "The presence of a radio set is not sufficient to suggest more
than the most attenuated analogy to wiretapping. Petitioner was talking confiden-
tially and indiscreetly with one he trusted, and he was overheard. This was due
to aid from a transmitter and receiver, to be sure, but with the same effect on his
privacy as if agent Lee had been eavesdropping outside an open window." 343
U.S. at 753-754. Mr. Justice Jackson's comparison of the agent's act of concealing
a microphone on his person so that he could transmit the defendant's incriminating
conversation to the act of eavesdropping outside the defendant's window indicates
that the Court used a property concept as the standard in determining whether
or not the defendant's fourth amendment rights had been violated. If a person
is eavesdropping outside some person's window, there is no physical trespass com-
mitted. If there was no physical trespass, then according to the property rationale,
there is no violation of fourth amendment rights.
Once again the dissenting Justices raised strong objections to the use of the
property concept as a standard. Mr. Justice Frankfurter asserted: "The progress of
science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop
with wiretapping. Ways may someday be developed by which the government with-
out removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by
which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the
home. . . . The circumstances of the present case show how the rapid advances of
science are made available for that police intrusion into our private lives against
which the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution was set on guard." 343 U.S.
at 759 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Mr. Justice Burton, also dissenting: "The Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures is not limited to the seizure of tangible things.
It extends to intangibles, such as spoken words." 343 U.S. at 765 (Burton, J.,
dissenting). See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
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had taken place in the "intangible" area of wiretapping and eavesdrop-
ping. In Silverman v. United States,48 the Court ruled that the actions
of law enforcement officers in attaching an electronic device, called a
"spike mike," to the heating duct of the defendants' house, constituted a
violation of the fourth amendment, and hence, conversations that were
overheard were inadmissible as evidence. Mr. Justice Stewart indicated
that the Court's decision was based in part on the physical trespass of the
"spike mike" into the defendants' home:
The record in this case shows that the eavesdropping was accomplished by means of
an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by the petitioners
: .,. . Here, . . . the officers overheard the petitioners' conversations only by usurp-
ing part of the petitioners' house or office-a heating system which was an integral
part of the premises occupied by the petitioners, a usurpation that was effected with-
out their knowledge or consent.49
But, part of the Court's opinion contained references to a more abstract
standard to be used in the adjudication of the right of privacy:
The Fourth Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long his-
tory. At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion . . . . The decision here
does not turn upon the technicality of a trespass upon a party wall ...it is based
upon the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.50
As expressed in Silverman, the Supreme Court indicated dissatisfaction
with the limitations of the property rationale.
Prior to the Supreme Court's rejection of the property standard in
Katz v. United States5 1 in 1967, several cases continued the development
of the right of privacy rationale. In Jones v. United States,52 the Su-
preme Court held that the defendant, who had been convicted of violating
federal narcotics laws, had standing to contend that law enforcement of-
ficers' entry and seizure of evidence were unreasonable notwithstanding
the fact that he testified that the property seized was not his and that the
place of the arrest was not his home. In rejecting the view that the de-
48. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
49. Id. at 509-11.
50. 365 U.S. at 512. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, develops this concept:
"The concept of 'an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises,' on which
the present decision rests, seems to me to be beside the point. Was not the wrong
in both cases done when the intimacies of the home were tapped, recorded, or re-
vealed. . . . Our concern should not be with the trivialities of the local law of
trespass, . . . But neither should the command of the Fourth Amendment be limited
by nice distinctions turning on the kind of eletcronic equipment employed. Rather
our sole concern should be with whether the privacy of the home was invaded.
365 U.S. at 513 (Douglas, J., concurring).
51. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
52. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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fendant must assert proprietary interests in the evidence seized in order
to claim a violation of his fourth amendment rights, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter asserted:
We are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the
law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving
the body of private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law,
has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the
area from which they derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of these
distinctions in the homeland of the common law.53
Thus, one more property characteristic had been removed from the
right of privacy.
The most significant case in the development of an abstract privacy
standard is Griswold v. State of Connecticut,5 4 in which the Court held
that the state law forbiding the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally in-
trudes upon the right of marital privacy. In reversing the defendants'
conviction for disseminating contraceptive information, Mr. Justice Doug-
las declared:
The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of
Rights. The right to educate a child in a school of the parents' choice-whether
public or private or parochial-is also not mentioned. . . . Yet the First Amend-
ment has been construed to include certain of those rights. . . . The right of free-
dom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right
to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read . . . and freedom of inquiry ....
Without those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure. . . . In
other words, the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion. . . . The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance. 55
Griswold is important because for the first time, the Court recognized the
right of privacy as an independent, constitutional doctrine, and thereby
53. Id. at 266. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963),
the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule barred the use of intangible as
well as tangible evidence. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966);
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
54. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
55. Id. at 482-484. Mr. Justice Goldberg concurring: "The language and history
of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers of the Constitution believed
that there are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringe-
ment, which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the
first eight constitutional Amendments." 381 U.S. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
See also Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded
Law of Privacy, 64 MIcH. L. Rav. 197 (1965); Mc Kay, The Right of Privacy: Ema-
nations and Intimations, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 259 (1965).
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laid the foundation for the Supreme Court's rejection of the property ra-
tionale in Katz v. United States.ssa
In Katz, the Court ruled that the government's activities in electron-
ically listening to and recording the defendant's words spoken in a public
phone violated the privacy upon which the defendant had justifiably re-
lied and thus constituted an unreasonable search and seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment, notwithstanding the fact that the elec-
tronic eavesdropping device did not penetrate the physical wall of the
phone booth. Mr. Justice Stewart's statement of the Court's opinion
clearly rejects the property standard:
[We] have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure
of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements overheard
without any 'technical trespass under local property law'. . . . Once this much is
acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes
clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of
a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. We conclude that the underpinnings
of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the
'trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.56
Because electronic eavesdropping devices had been developed, which
were so sensitive that they did not require a physical trespass to be effec-
tive, the property rationale in the area of privacy simply had become
outdated. 7 In order to protect an individual's right to be free from un-
reasonable searches and seizures in the area of wiretapping and eaves-
dropping, the Supreme Court rejected the old standard and adopted a
more abstract view of the fourth amendment guarantees.
In the area of administrative searches and seizures, a similar trend in
case law began to discredit the second theory which evolved from Boyd-
that is, the fourth amendment prohibited unreasonable searches and sei-
zures only when the object of the search was evidence of a crime. The
criminal law approach to the fourth amendment was first undermined in
a federal court of appeals decision, District of Columbia v. Little.58
55a. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
56. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 353.
57. Law enforcement officers could invade a person's privacy by eavesdropping,
yet not violate the physical intrusion concept by using a very sensitive instrument.
Therefore, the property rationale only limited the type of eavesdropping device
used, not the invasions of one's privacy. BASSIOUNI, supra note 37, at 396 (1969).
58. 178 F. 2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
There have only been eight cases which have decided the question of whether or not
the imposition of penal sanctions for refusing entry to an inspector who lacks a
warrant is a violation of the individual's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Holding no constitutional violation: Frank v. Maryland, 359
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Therein the defendant had been convicted of interfering with an inspector
of the Health Department by refusing to unlock the door of her home at
the command of the inspector, who was without a warrant. The court
held that the fourth amendment prohibited the inspector from entering
the defendant's home without her consent and without a warrant. In re-
futing the proposed argument that the fourth amendment applied only to
criminal searches and seizures Judge Prettyman stated:
It is said to us that the regulations sought to be enforced by this search only inciden-
tally involved criminal charges, that their purpose is to protect the public health.
It is argued that the Fourth Amendment provision regarding searches is premised
upon and limited by the Fifth Amendment provision regarding self-incrimination.
It is said to us that therefore there is no prohibition against searches of private homes
by government officers, unless they are searching for evidence of crime. . . . The
argument is wholly without merit, preposterous in fact. The basic premise of the
prohibition against searches was not protection against self-incrimination; it was the
common law right of a man to privacy in his home, a right which is one of the
indispensable ultimate essentials of our concept of civilization. It was firmly es-
tablished in the common law as one of the bright features of the Anglo-Saxon con-
tributions to human progress. It was not related to crime or to suspicion of crime.
It belonged to all men, not merely to criminals, real or suspected. So much is clear
from any examination of history . . . . It has no greater justification in reason.
To say that a man suspected of crime has a right to protection against search of his
home without a warrant, but that a man not suspected of crime has no such protec-
tion, is a fantastic absurdity.59
Although the federal court had ruled that a warranfless administrative
search violated the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures, this precedent was not immediately accepted by
the Supreme Court.
In Frank v. State of Maryland,6 0 the Court refused to invoke the re-
U.S. 360 (1959); Camara v. Municipal Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 128 (1965) re-
versed, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 67 Wash. 2d 465 (1965),
reversed, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 541 (1967);
Commonwealth v. Hadley, 351 Mass. 439, 222 N.E. 2d 681 (1966), per curiam,
Hadley v. Massachusetts, 388 U.S. 464 (1967); Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124
A. 2d 764 (C.A. 1956); City of St. Louis v. Evans, 337 S.W. 2d 948 (Mo. 1960).
Contra, District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F. 2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1950), a! 'd on
other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950). See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
Lafave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camera and See
Cases, S. C-r. REV. 1, 4 n. 10 (1967). See generally DePass v. City of Spar-
tanburg, 234 S.C. 198, 107 S.E. 2d 350 (1959); State v. Rees, 139 N.W. 2d 406
(1966).
59. 178 F. 2d 13, 16-17. See United States v. Eighteen Cases of Tuna Fish,
5 F. 2d 979 (W.D. Va. 1925); United States v. 62 Packages, 48 F. Supp. 878 (W.D.
Wis. 1943), as affirmed, 142 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1944). See generally Schenk
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878).




strictions of the fourth amendment against a warrantless health inspection
that was based on probable cause. The defendant was convicted of vio-
lating a provision of the Baltimore City Code for refusing to allow the
Commissioner of Health into his home without a warrant. The Commis-
sioner wanted to investigate a suspected health "nuisance." Consequent-
ly, the defendant was fined twenty dollars. The Supreme Court held
that in light of the long history of warrantless health inspections and of
modern health needs, a city ordinance that provides penal sanctions for
refusal to allow a warrantless health inspection, based on probable cause,
is not violative of the fourth amendment. 61 Mr. Justice Frankfurter out-
lined the criminal search rationale in the Court's opinion:
But giving the fullest scope to this constitutional right to privacy, its protection can-
not be here invoked. The attempted inspection of appellant's home is merely to de-
termine whether conditions exist which the Baltimore Health Code proscribes ...
No evidence for criminal prosecution is sought to be seized. Appellant is simply di-
rected to do what he could have been ordered to do without any inspection ....
Appellant's resistance can only be based, not on admissible self-protection, but on a
rarely voiced denial of any official justification for seeking to enter his home ...
Thus, not only does the inspection touch at most upon the periphery of the impor-
tant interests safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against official
intrusion, but it is hedged about with safeguards designed to make the least possible
demand on the individual occupant, and to cause only the slightest restriction on his
claims of privacy. 62
Therefore, in its first decision involving a warrantless administrative
search, the Supreme Court found no violation of the defendant's Fourth
Amendment Rights."3
61. It should be noted that Frank was decided in the years of uncertainty
between Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 642
(1961) as to the precise scope of the fourth amendment's application to state offi-
cials. Lafave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camera
and See Cases, S. CT. REV. 1, 6 (1967).
62. 359 U.S. at 366-67. Many authors have been critical of this concept:
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN THE SUPREME COURT 249 (1966); 8 WIGMORE
ON EVIDENCE § 2264 (3rd ed. 1940); Barret, Personal Rights, Property Rights, And
The Fourth Amendment, S. CT. REV. 46 (1960); Comment, Administrative Searches
And the Fourth Amendment, 30 Mo. L. REV. 612, 621 (1965); Comment, Search
And Seizure In The Supreme Court: Shadows on The Fourth Amendment, 28 U.
CHl. L. REV. 664, 669, 674, 687-88 (1961). See generally Stahl & Kahn, Inspec-
tions and the Fourth Amendment, 11 U. PiTr. L. REV. 256, 275 (1950); Comment,
Administrative Inspections and the Fourth Amendment-A Rationale, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 288, 291 (1965); Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Re-
quiem for Wolf, S. CT. REV. 1, 41 (1961).
63. However, Mr. Justice Frankfurter alludes to an abstract view of the right of
privacy in part of his opinion: "Against this background two protections emerge
from the broad constitutional proscription of official invasion. The first of these
is the right to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy, the right to shut the
door on officials of the state unless their entry is under proper authority of law.
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In 1967,64 the Supreme Court expressly overruled the holding in
Frank. In Camara v. Municipal Court,65 the Court held that adminis-
The second, and intimately related protection, is self-protection: the right to resist
unauthorized entry which has as its design the securing of information to fortify
the coercive power of the state against the individual." 359 U.S. at 365.
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, asserted: "The Court now casts a shadow over
that guarantee as respects searches and seizures in civil cases. Any such conclu-
sion would require considerable editing and revision of the Fourth Amendment. For
by its terms it protects the citizen against unreasonable searches and seizures by
government, whaetver may be the complaint." 359 U.S. at 374 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). Mr. Justice Douglas' main criticism of the majority opinion centered on Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's analysis of the development of fourth amendment case law. In
analyzing Entick v. Carrington, [1765] 19 Howell State Trials 1029, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter points out that Entick was guilty of libel, which is a criminal offense.
With the support of Boyd, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), he concludes that the fourth
amendment prohibits unreasonable search and seizure only when the object of the
search is criminal evidence. Mr. Justice Douglas counters that Entick was in fact
only a non-conformist, whom the English government wished to punish for his out-
spoken views. This supports the contention that the fourth amendment is not
limited only to criminal searches, but prohibits all unreasonable searches and
seizures. 359 U.S. at 376-77 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Ullman v. United States,
350 U.S. 422, 445-46 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Feldman v. United States,
322 U.S. 487, 499 (1944) (Black, J., dissenting); TAYLOR, THE AMERICAN CON-
STITUTION 234 (1911). Lord Camden's statement in Entick would seem to favor
Mr. Douglas' viewpoint: "[W]henever a favourite libel is published (and these com-
positions are apt to be favourites) the whole kingdom in a month or two becomes
criminal, and it would be difficult to find one innocent jury amongst so many
millions of offenders." Entick v. Carrington, [1765] 19 Howell State Trials at
1072. "[I]t was criminal at common law, not only to write public seditious papers
and false news; but likewise to publish any news without a license from the king,
though it was true and innocent." Entick v. Carrington, [1765] 19 Howell State
Trials at 1070. (Emphasis added).
64. In Parrish v. Civil Service Conun'n of County of Alameda, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d
260, 425 P. 2d 223 (1967), the state supreme court held that early morning mass
raids, which were conducted without search warrants, for the purpose of determining
a recipient's welfare eligibility were violations of his right to privacy. The
searches were clearly unreasonable, because they were conducted in the early morn-
ing hours and the recipients, who were searched, were not selected on the basis of
probable cause. It is interesting to note that Judge Tobriner rejected the welfare
agency's argument that the raids did not violate the recipient's fourth amendment
rights because of the Supreme Court's decision in Frank. He pointed out that
Frank held that the Fourth Amendment applied to searches for criminal evidence
or forfeitures. "[I1t was on the issue of the right to be secure from searches for
evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions or for forfeitures that the great battle
for fundamental liberty was fought." Frank 359 U.S. at 365. (emphasis added).
Judge Tobriner then equated the forfeiture language in Frank to the searches for
evidence of welfare ineligibility in Parrish. "Since the Court thus declared that a
search directed at securing evidence in aid of a forfeiture should be treated in
the same manner as a search for evidence of crime, the Frank decision affords
no support ...... Supra at 266, 425 P. 2d at 227. Therefore, Judge Tobriner
concluded that the fourth amendment protected an aid recipient from unreasonable
searches for welfare ineligibility even though Frank had not been overruled.
65. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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trative searches by municipal health and safety inspectors constitute sig-
nificant intrusions upon privacy to be protected by the fourth amend-
ment; and such searches, when authorized and conducted without the
warrant procedure, lack traditional fourth amendment safeguards. Mr.
Justice White described the extension of the fourth amendment's protec-
tion to administrative searches and seizures.
We may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private property
is a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and in-
strumentalities of crime. But, we cannot agree that the Fourth Amendment interests
at stake are merely 'peripheral.' It is surely anomalous to say that the individual
and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when
the individual is suspected of criminal behavior . . . . [Elven the most law abiding
citizen has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the
sanctity of his home may be broken by official authority .... 66
Like its rejection of the limitations of the property rationale in Katz, the
Supreme Court, in Camara, eliminated the criminal search restriction on
the fourth amendment and extended its protection to warrantless adminis-
trative searches.
It is clear then that the Supreme Court was at the crossroads of the
fourth amendment in deciding Wyman. It could return to the criminal
investigation rationale of Frank with the result that the scope of the
fourth amendment's protection would be limited to unreasonable crim-
inal searches and seizures. Or the Court could follow Camara and ex-
tend the fourth amendment's protection to warrantless administrative
searches. Unpredictably, Wyman rejected the rationales of both Frank
and Camara. The Court asserted that the welfare interview did not qual-
ify as a search under the meaning of the fourth amendment.61 There-
fore, the aid recipient did not have any right of privacy to protect him
from this administrative intrusion.
Justice Blackmun attempted to distinguish Frank and Camara from
Wyman on the ground that in the former two cases refusal to allow war-
66. Id. at 530-31. In See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), Camara's
holding that the fourth amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to
permit a warrantless code enforcement inspection of his personal residence was
extended to similar inspections of commercial structures.
67. Mr. Justice Blackmun asserted: "In Camara Mr. Justice White,
pointed out, . . . that one's Fourth Amendment protection subsists apart from
his being suspected of criminal behavior. . . . This natural and quite proper
protective attitude, however, is not a factor in this case, for the seemingly obvious
and simple reason that we are not concerned here with any search by the New York
social service agency in the Fourth Amendment meaning of that term. . . . It
is also true that the caseworker's posture in the home visit is, perhaps, in a sense
both rehabilitative and investigative. But this latter aspect, we think, is given too
broad a character and far more emphasis than it deserves if it is equated with a
search in the traditional criminal law context." 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971).
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rantless, administrative searches resulted in criminal prosecutions, while
in the present case refusal resulted only in termination of welfare bene-
fits.6s However, this analysis seems to resurrect Frank's criminal search
rationale, which had been expressly rejected by the Court in Camara. 9
The result of Justice Blackmun's analysis in Wyman is confusion as to
whether or not the fourth amendment protects an individual from warrant-
less, administrative searches.
Mr. Justice Marshall, dissatisfied with this analysis, expressed his belief
that the fourth amendment applies to each and every governmental in-
trusion and that the nature of the welfare home visit is investigative. 70
He also objected to Justice Blackmun's theory that the scope of the fourth
amendment is determined by the nature of the penalty imposed by the
government, not by the character of the governmental intrusion.7 1  Mr.
68. Mr. Justice Blackmun asserted: "Frank was a criminal prosecution for the
owner's refusal to permit entry. So, too, was See. Camara had to do with a
writ of prohibition sought to prevent an already pending criminal prosecution. The
community welfare aspects, of course, were highly important, but each case arose
in a criminal context where a genuine search was denied and prosecution followed.
In contrast, Mrs. James is not being prosecuted for her refusal to permit the home
visit and is not about to be so prosecuted. . . . We have not been told, and
have not found, that her refusal is made a criminal act by any applicable New York
or federal statute. The only consequence of her refusal is that the payment of
benefits ceases." 400 U.S. 309, 325 (1971) (emphasis added).
69. Mr. Justice Blackmun states: "The home visit is not a criminal investiga-
tion, and does not equate with a criminal investigation, and despite the announced
fears of Mrs. James and those who would join her, it is not in aid of any criminal
proceeding. If the visitation serves to discourage misrepresentation or fraud, such
a by-product of that visit does not impress upon the visit itself a dominant criminal
investigative aspect." 400 U.S. 309, 323 (1971). Even though the Court uses a
criminal prosecution standard for the purpose of including refusals of warrantless,
administrative searches that result in quasi-criminal fines, rather than the Frank
criminal search rationale, the two tests are so similar that it is very difficult to dis-
tinguish them.
70. "The Court's assertion that this case concerns no search 'in the Fourth
Amendment meaning of the term' is neither 'obvious' nor 'simple.' I should have
thought that the Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public
upon personal security. . . . In an era of rapidly burgeoning governmental activi-
ties and their concomitant inspectors, caseworkers, and researchers, a restriction of
the Fourth Amendment to 'the traditional criminal law context' tramples the an-
cient concept that a man's home is his castle." 400 U.S. 309, - (1971) (Marshall
and Brennan, J.J., dissenting). He further states: "[T]he welfare visit is not
some sort of purely benevolent inspection. No one questions the motives of the
dedicated welfare caseworker. Of course, caseworkers seek to be friends, but the
point is that they are also required to be sleuths. . . . Time and again, in briefs
and at oral argument, appellants emphasized the need to enter AFDC homes to
guard against welfare fraud and child abuse, both of which are felonies." 400 U.S.
at - (Marshall and Brennan, J.J., dissenting).
71. "[T]here is neither logic in, nor precedent for, the view that the ambit of
the Fourth Amendment depends not on the character of the governmental intrusion
Justice Douglas, dissenting, also, described the abstract foundations of
the fourth amendment, for the purposes of demonstrating that the amend-
ment applied to the social welfare home visit.72
The dissenting Justices in Wyman raised valid objections to the ma-
jority holding. Presently, an individual cannot be certain whether the
fourth amendment protects against all warrantless administrative searches
or whether the amendment prohibits only specific government inva-
sions supported by criminal sanctions. In the future, a person will be un-
able to rely on the assurance that other types of warrantless administra-
tive intrusions will be prohibited by the fourth amendment. The decision
in Wyman causes confusion as to the exact breadth of the protections of
the fourth amendment in the area of administrative searches and seizures.
If the holding in Wyman creates confusion as to the scope of the pro-
tections of the fourth amendment, does this decision undermine the de-
veloping trend that requires prior judicial supervision of any governmen-
tal invasion of an individual's right to privacy, except in a narrowly de-
fined set of circumstances? That is, how great is the right possessed and
when is the search unreasonable? This is where the second inquiry be-
comes important. Is a search warrant, obtained from a "neutral and de-
tached" magistrate prior to entry, necessary to the reasonableness of an
administrative investigation?
Historically, the right to be free from unreasonable governmental
searches and seizures has been deemed to be a personal right.73 It has
been held that these individual rights do not extend to investigations into
matters of a public or quasi-public nature. 74  Also, the scope of the
but on the size of the club that the State wields against a resisting citizen. Even
if the magnitude of the penalty were relevant, which sanction for resisting the
search is more severe? For protecting the privacy of her home, Mrs. James lost
the sole means of support for herself and her infant son. For protecting the pri-
vacy of his commercial warehouse, Mr. See received a $100 suspended fine." 400
U.S. 309,- (1971). (Marshall and Brennan, J.J., dissenting).
72. "The Fourth, of course, speaks of 'unreasonable' searches and seizures,
while the First is written in absolute terms. But the right of privacy which the
Fourth protects is perhaps as vivid in our lives as the right of expression sponsored
by the First." 400 U.S. 309, - (1971). (Douglas, J., dissenting).
73. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Steeber v. United
States, 198 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1952). Cf. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960).
74. For example, the personal right to immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures has been held not to apply to the following public interest situations:
(A) Orders issued under statutory authority requiring common carriers to furnish
information concerning their operations. Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States,
300 U.S. 139 (1937). See generally Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946);
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1904); (B) Searches and
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fourth amendment does not extend to the rules and regulations adopted in
the exercise of police power for the protection of public good, health and
morals. 75 However, a public inspection must be conducted in a reason-
seizures, under statutory authority, providing for collection of the public revenue.
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911); authorization, under city ordi-
nance, for a city tax collector to examine cigarette and vending machines and re-
ceptacles located on the premises of the seller. See generally Ploch v. City of St.
Louis, 345 Mo. 1069, 138 S.W. 2d 1020 (1940); (C) Selective Service Acts pro-
viding for compulsory military training and service. See O'Connell v. United
States, 253 U.S. 142 (1920). Cf. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605
(1931), overruled, Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946); (D) Attach-
ments of the contents of safe deposit boxes. See Carples v. Cumberland Coal
and Iron Co., 240 N.Y. 187, 148 N.E. 185 (1925); (E) The provisional seizure, in
connection with contempt proceedings, of property for the purpose of satisfying any
fine to be imposed on the owner. Camden County Beverage Co. v. Blair, 46
F. 2d 648 (D.C.D. N.J. 1930); (F) The seizure of prisoners' letters in the posses-
sion of prison officials under established prison procedure. Stroud v. United States,
251 U.S. 15 (1919). See generally Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966); and (G) pursuant to the general rule that authorizes officers to arrest
without an arrest warrant for misdemeanors committed in their presence, when a per-
son commits any act which a liquor law declares to be a misdemeanor in the
presence of an officer, the officer may arrest such offender. United States v.
Haskins, 213 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). See generally Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
75. Camden County Beverage Co. v. Blair, 46 F. 2d 648 (D.C.D. N.J. 1930);
Elliott v. Haskins, 20 Cal. App. 2d 591, 67 P. 2d 698 (1937). Contra, Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967);
District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F. 2d 13 (1lth Cir. 1949), a!'d onl other
grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
For example, the personal right to privacy has been held not to apply in the fol-
lowing circumstances: (A) Requiring automobiles to carry license numbers.
People v. Schneider, 139 Mich. 673, 103 N.W. 172 (1905); (B) Premises licensed
for the sale of liquor. Law enforcement officer has the right to inspect without a
warrant. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, §§ 109, 11, 112 (2), 190 (1965). See
United States v. Duffy, 282 F. Supp. 777 (S.D. N.Y. 1968); People v.
Allen, 407 Ill. 596, 96 N.E. 2d 446 (1950); State of Tennessee v. Nolan, 161 Tenn.
298, 30 S.W. 2d 601 (1930); Vairada v. State of Wisconsin, 182 Wis. 309, 195
N.W. 937 (1923); State of Wisconsin v. Kollat, 190 Wis. 255, 208 N.W. 900
(1926); Walsh v. State of Wisconsin, 183 Wis. 93, 197 N.W. 192 (1924); Cf.
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (indicates officers
cannot break into a storeroom). See generally State of Wisconsin v. Hoffman,
245 Wis. 367, 14 N.W. 2d 146 (1944); Silber v. Bloodgood, 177 Wis. 608, 188
N.W. 84 (1922) (The breaking of locks may be proper where no other means of
access are available); (C) Prescribers and dispensers of Narcotics. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 22-8, 22-15, 22-18, 22-19, 22-20, 22-38 (1965); (D) Dealers in
Deadly Weapons. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 24-4(c) (1965); (E) Motor vehicle
and vehicle parts dealers. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95-1/2, § 5-401 (c) (1965); People v.
Levy, 370 Ill. 82, 17 N.E. 2d 967 (1938); (F) Weighing of motor vehicles. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 95-1/2, §229 (1965); People v. Lafin, 59 Ill. App. 2d 489, 208
N.E. 2d 105 (1965); People v. Munziato, 24 Ill. 2d 432, 182 N.E. 2d 199 (1962);
(G) Requiring chattel mortgage, salary loan or small loan brokers to keep records
which are subject to inspection. Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace, 216 Ind. 114,
23 N.E. 2d 472 (1939). See Sanning v. City of Cincinnati, 81 Ohio 142, 90 N.E.
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able manner, even though most state statutes do not limit the right to in-
vestigate by requiring a showing of probable cause.
76
125 (1909); (H) Requiring food dealers to furnish samples of their products for
inspection and analysis and providing for the seizure and destruction of food unfit for
human consumption. North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306
(1908). See Commonwealth v. Abel, 275 Ky. 802, 122 S.W. 2d 757 (1939);
(I) Pawnbrokers-there is a right of investigation because of the facility it furnishes
for the commission of crime and its concealment. Provident Loan Soc. v. City
and County of Denver, 64 Colo. 400, 172 P. 10 (1918); Epstein v. State, 211 Tenn.
633, 366 S.W. 2d 914 (1963). See City of Chicago v. Lowenthal, 242 Ill.
404, 90 N.E. 287 (1909). See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 107-1/2, §5.6 (1965). See
generally Lafave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law . . . has not . . .
run Smooth," 2 Ill. L.F. 323-328 (1966); (K) Subpoenas--courts cannot compel the
compulsory production of a person's private books to be used against him in a
criminal proceeding because this amounts to unreasonable search and seizure.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Owens v. State, 133 Miss. 753, 98
So. 233 (1923). See Levy v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. 600, 38 P. 965 (1895), writ
of error dismissed, 167 U.S. 175 (1897); Dalton v. Calhoun County District Court,
164 Iowa 187, 145 N.W. 498 (1912); Boston & M. Consolidated Copper and
Silver Mining Co. v. District Court, 27 Mont. 441, 71 P. 602 (1903). See generally
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). A subpoena cannot be too broad or
it amounts to an unreasonable search and seizure. Me Mann v. Securities and Ex-
change Commission, 87 F. 2d 377 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684
(1937). See generally Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920). Also a subpoena for records must be clear. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43 (1906). See Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908);
Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924); ex parte
Gould, 60 Tex. Crim. 442, 132 S.W. 364 (1910). See generally Adams v. F.T.C.
296 F. 2d 861, 866 (1961). But there are many instances where a subpoena, that
meets the requirements of clearness and definiteness, is permitted: (1) A court can
compel a person to disclose any property or knowledge concerning a decedent's es-
tate in a remedial proceeding. Levy v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. 600, 38 P. 965
(1895), writ of error dismissed, 167 U.S. 175 (1897); (2) with a subpoena duces
tecum, a court can compel a person to produce documentary evidence. Southern
Pacific Co. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 206, 100 P. 2d 302 (1940). See Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). See generally Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911); Federal Mining and Smelting Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 26 Idaho
391, 143 P. 1173 (1914); Carden v. Ensminger, 329 Ill. 612, 161 N.E. 37 (1928).
A corporation cannot claim the protection of the fourth amendment because it is not
a person and it must be licensed by the state. United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186
(1946); Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909); Consolidated
Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1907). See Grant v. United States, 227
U.S. 74 (1913); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913); Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). See generally Grange Lumber Co. v. Henneford,
185 Wash. 180, 53 P. 2d 743 (1936); Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.05-
3.06 (1958); and (L) Boarder searches and searches of naval vessels may be made
without a warrant. 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (1964) (Boarding vessels); Olson v. United
States, 68 F. 2d 8 (2d Cir. 1933) (Search of vessels); United States v. Hayes, 52
F. 2d 977 (E.D. N.Y. 1931); 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1964) (Customs and border
searches). United States v. McGlone, 266 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Va. 1967). See
Henderson v. United States, 390 F. 2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967). (Border Searches).
76. Lafave, supra note 75, at 255. See State v. Nolan, 161 Tenn. 293, 30 S.W.
2d 601 (1930).
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In the area of criminal law the test of reasonableness invariably re-
quires a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate ex-
cept in a narrowly defined set of exceptions. 77 If a governmental officer
enters the home without a valid search warrant, his search is unreason-
able per se.7 8 In Johnson v. United States,7 9 Mr. Justice Jackson mould-
ed this general rule into a concrete form:
77. The necessity for a search warrant is not limited to searches of buildings
used as homes. It has been extended to: (A) Hotel rooms. United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); John-
son v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293 (1966); (B) Room in a rooming house. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451 (1948); (C) Business offices. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
344 (1931); (D) Barn was determined to be part of the owners curtillage even
though it was 70-80 yards away from the house. Walker v. United States, 225 F.
2d 447 (5th Cir. 1955); and (E) a side alley like a yard or lawn, if used as part of
the home, is protected. Harris v. State, 203 Md. 165, 99 A. 2d 725 (1953).
However, searches have been upheld that involved the right to make a warrantless
entry into a transiently occupied hotel or motel after it has been vacated. Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), reh. denied, 362 U.S. 984 (1960). See gen-
erally McShann v. United States, 67 F. 2d 655 (10th Cir. 1933); People v. Martin,
45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P. 2d 855 (1955); Manchester Press Club v. State Liquor Com-
mission, 89 N.H. 442, 200 A. 407 (1938). Also, searches in open fields and woods,
not connected with the curtillage, can be made without a warrant. Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). Finally, a jail has none of the attributes of a home.
Lanza v. State of New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962). The Court asserted: "But
to say that a public jail is the equivalent of a man's 'house' or that it is a place
where he can claim constitutional immunity from search or seizure of his person,
his papers or his effects, is at best a novel argument. . . . Yet, without attempt-
ing either to define or to predict the ultimate scope of Fourth Amendment protection,
it is obvious that a jail shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an auto-
mobile, an office, or a hotel room. In prison, official surveillance has traditionally
been the order of the day." 370 U.S. at 143.
The most significant part of the conflict that has thwarted the Supreme Court's
attempts over the years to develop a coherent body of Fourth Amendment law has
been the disagreement concerning the importance of requiring law enforcement of-
ficers to secure warrants. One segment of the Court has argued that a determi-
nation by a magistrate of probable cause as a precondition of any search or seizure
is so essential that the fourth amendment is violated whenever the police might
reasonably have obtained a warrant but failed to do so. The other group has ar-
gued with equal force that a test of reasonableness, applied after the fact of search
or seizure, when the police attempt to introduce the fruits in evidence, affords
ample safeguard for the rights in question. Therefore, the relevant test is not
whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was
reasonable. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
78. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762 (1969); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-529 (1967);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 481-482 (1963); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613-615 (1961);
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 380 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting), overruled,
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 32 (1925). In United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932), Mr.
Justice Butler asserted: "Indeed, the informed and deliberate determinations of
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The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous offi-
cers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any
assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determin-
ation to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a
warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes
secure only in the discretion of police officers.8 0
Lack of a valid search warrant is not excused if the law enforcement
officer enters a home on a belief that there is an article concealed there;81
or if he enters on mere suspicion that a crime has been committed in the
home; 2 or where the only reason for failing to get a warrant was incon-
venience to the officers.83
There are three specific exceptions to the mandatory search warrant
requirement that are based on the presence of "exigent circumstances":
(1) A police officer may seize evidence of a crime that is in "plain view"
in a home without a search warrant, if he has prior justification for being
magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what searches and seizures are
permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over the hurried action of of-
ficers and others who may happen to make the arrests. Security against unlawful
searches is more likely to be attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance
upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting under the excitement
that attends the capture of persons accused of crime." Id. at 464. In McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), Mr. Justice Douglas stated the same general
rule: "Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a mag-
istrate between the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals
nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an
objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the
law. The right to privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of
those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. Power is a
heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be
trusted. And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the
police before they violate the privacy of the home. We cannot be true to that con-
stitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a show-
ing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigen-
cies of the situation made that course imperative." Id. at 455-456. (Emphasis
added). See De Pater v. United States, 34 F. 2d 275 (4th Cir. 1929).
79. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
80. Id. at 13-14.
81. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
82. District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F. 2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1950), a!]'d on
other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950) (Felony); Mc Clurg v. Brenton, 123 Iowa 368,
98 N.W. 881 (1904) (Misdemeanor). Cf. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
83. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615 (1961); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. at 13-15.
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in the home and if he discovers the evidence inadvertently; 84 (2) under
Carroll v. United States,85 the police may make a warrantless search of
an automobile, if they have probable cause and if they do not have time
to procure a warrant from a magistrate; and (3) law enforcement offi-
cers may make a warrantless search incident to an arrest, if the arrest
itself is valid.86
The major premise of the "plain view" doctrine is that in each case the
police officer had a prior justification for being in the home before he
discovered the criminal evidence. Therefore, the "plain view" doctrine
may be applied to a situation in which the police have a warrant to
search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search
come across some other article of incriminating character.8 r It may also
be applied to a circumstance where the initial intrusion that brings the
police into plain view of the evidence is not supported by a search war-
rant but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Therefore, the police may inadvertently discover criminal evidence while
making a "search incident to an arrest"88 that is appropriately limited in
scope under the existing law. Finally, the plain view exception has been
applied where a law enforcement officer is not searched for criminal
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across
an incriminating article.89 Because there is a danger of a general search, 90
the scope of the plain view exception is limited by the requirement of
inadvertent discovery.91
84. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971); United States v.
Eisner, 297 F. 2d 595, 597 (6th Cir. 1962); Takahashi v. United States, 143 F.
2d 118 (9th Cir. 1944).
85. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
86. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See generally Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 458-462.
87. Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 571-572 (1969); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282
U.S. 344, 358 (1931); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925).
88. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763 (1969). See Warden, Mary-
land Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Hester v. United States, 265
U.S. 57 (1924).
89. Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23, 43 (1963). Cf. Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
90. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-630 (1886). See Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195-196 (1927).
91. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1967);
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559, 563 (1926); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925). See United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 78 (1950), overruled, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 (1932); Go-Bart Im-
porting Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931).
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In Carroll v. United States,92 the Supreme Court developed the second
exception to the mandatory warrant requirement based on the presence-
of "exigent circumstances." The defendants' automobile had been
stopped and searched on the highway by the police because there was
probable cause to believe that they were violating the National Prohibition
Act. The law enforcement officers found sixty-eight bottles of illegal
alcohol concealed in the car. Mr. Justice Taft stated the reasons for al-
lowing a warrantless search of the automobile on the highway:
We have made a somewhat extended reference to these statutes to show that the
guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amend-
ment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or
other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained,
and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods,
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.98
Therefore the basis of the "exigent circumstance" exception in Carroll
was the fact that an automobile could be rapidly moved out of the juris-
diction where the warrant had to be obtained. 94 But Mr. Justice Taft ap-
plied limitations to the scope of this warrantless search of moveable
vehicles:
In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used
In cases where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing offi-
cer acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court probable cause. 95
Thus, a warrantless search of a moving vehicle must be based on probable
cause and a search warrant must be obtained if it is reasonably practica-
ble to secure one.
In Schmerber v. California,9 6 the Supreme Court held that the compul-
sory testing, by a physician of the petitioner's blood over his objections
92. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
93. Id. at 153. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849); O'Neill v.
Central Leather Co., 87 N.J.L. 552, 94 A. 789 (1915) (Military searches under
martial law).
94. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Supreme Court gives
this analysis of the "exigent circumstances" described in Carroll: "[T]he car is
moveable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found
again if a warrant must be obtained. Hence, an immediate search is constitu-
tionally permissible." 399 U.S. at 51. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58
(1967); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Scher v. United States, 305
U.S. 251 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931). See generally
Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Meyer v. United States, 386
F. 2d 715 (1967).
95. 267 U.S. at 155-156.
96. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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did not violate the petitioner's rights under the fourth amendment be-
cause of the presence of exigent circumstances.9 7  Mr. Justice Brennan
described the rationale of the Court's holding:
We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly
after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system. Particu-
larly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a
hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out
a magistrate and secure a warrant. 98
Therefore, the Court again found a particular exigent circumstance under
which a valid warrantless search could be made without prior recourse
to a magistrate.
In Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden,9 the Supreme Court
held that police, who are in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing felon, may make a
warrantless search of any home which the suspect has entered. The fact
that the police are in immediate pursuit of the fleeing suspect and the
fact that a felon at large poses a dangerous threat to the public are valid
exigent circumstances that justify the warrantless search. Under these
conditions, it is obvious that prior recourse to a magistrate is impossible.
The final exception to the mandatory warrant requirement to search
for criminal evidence in a home, is a warrantless search incident to a
valid arrest. 100 In Trupiano v. United States,'0 ' the Supreme Court
held that no searches and seizures could be legitimated by the mere fact of
valid entry for purposes of arrest, so long as there was no showing of
special difficulties in obtaining a search warrant from a neutral magis-
trate. Thus, the Court declared that a police officer could not make a
97. The administering of a blood test by a physician in a hospital was deemed
a reasonable method for measuring the petitioners blood-alcohol level by the court.
Id. at 769-771. For an example of an obvious unreasonable search or method for
extracting evidence, see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (Stomach
pumping).
98. 384 U.S. at 770-771. In Thom v. New York Stock Exchange, 306 F. Supp.
1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court held that the New York statute that required all
employees of member firms of national security exchanges registered with the S.E.C.
to be fingerprinted as a condition of employment did not violate the fourth amend-
ment rights of the employees to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). In Hernandez v. United States,
353 F. 2d 624 (9th Cir. 1965), the court held that the fact that baggage, sus-
pected of containing illegal narcotics, was about to leave on an airliner, constituted
valid "exigent circumstances" and therefore, the bags could be legally seized with-
out a search warrant.
99. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
100. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), overruled, United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
101. 334 U.S. 699 (1948), overruled, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 66 (1950).
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warrantless search based only on the fact that he had made a valid ar-
rest. In addition, he must show that it was unreasonable for him to se-
cure a search warrant from a magistrate prior to the arrest. Therefore,
the relevant test was whether it was reasonable to procure a search war-
rant, not whether the search was itself reasonable i.e., did the officer
properly limit the area of his search. 10 2
This theory, developed in Trupiano, was overruled by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Rabinowitz,10 3 wherein the Court held that a
valid entry for purposes of arrest served to legitimate warrantless searches
and seizures throughout the premises where the arrest occurred, no mat-
ter how spacious those premises were. 10 4 However, the holding in Rabin-
owitz resulted in far-reaching, warrantless searches that revived the dan-
gers of the general warrants. 10 5
This problem was remedied, when the Supreme Court overruled Rabin-
owitz'0 6 in Chimel v. California.'0 7 In Chimel, the Court held that the
warrantless search of the defendant's entire house, incident to defendant's
valid arrest in his home on a burglary charge, was unreasonable because
it extended beyond the defendant's person and area from which he might
have obtained a weapon or incriminating evidence. Here, the Court ap-
plied the basic rule that the "search incident to an arrest" is an exception
to the warrant requirement and that its scope must therefore be strictly
defined in terms of the justifying exigent circumstances. The exigency
102. Trupiano has been open to criticism because it was absurd to permit the
police to make an entry in the dead of night for purposes of seizing the person by
force, and then refuse them permission to seize objects lying around in plain sight.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
103. 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768
(1969). See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), overruled, Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.
2d 905 (1955). See generally Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
104. The approach taken in Rabinowitz was open to criticism because it made
it so easy for the police to arrange to search a man's premises without a warrant
that the fourth amendment's protection became ineffective. Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
105. However, even under Rabinowitz, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that: "[A] search may be incident to an arrest 'only if it is substantially con-
temporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the ar-
rest'...." Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33 (1970). Accord, Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Cf. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32(1925). Under Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1967), the police cannot
legally seize a car, remove it, and search it at their leisure without a warrant.
Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968). Cf. Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
106. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) was also overruled in Chimel.
107. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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arises from the danger of harm to the arresting officer and the danger
of destruction of evidence within the reach of the arrestee. 1°8 Neither
type of exigency can justify the far-ranging searches that were authorized
in Rabinowitz. Thus, a warrant must be secured from a magistrate for
any search outside the person of the arrestee or the area under his imme-
diate control. In Chimel, the Supreme Court did not return to the hold-
ing of Trupiano, which indicated that a police officer must obtain a
search warrant to seize any evidence that he anticipates to be in the
home. Chimel solidifies the trend toward limiting the number of possible
exceptions to the mandatory warrant requirement for criminal searches. 109
Therefore, in most instances, a police officer must obtain a search war-
rant from a magistrate if he wishes to search a suspect's house for crim-
inal evidence.110
However, as to other types of intrusions"' on privacy, there has been
some disagreement as to whether they are unreasonable, if begun without
the judicial supervision of a magistrate. But a similar trend requiring
judicial auspices for any governmental invasion is present. In Terry v.
Ohio 2 (street search), the Supreme Court held that a police officer
without a search warrant could stop and detain a person on the street or
public premises for the purposes of briefly questioning him and obtaining
personal identification. The officer could also pat the outside clothing of
the detained individual for the purpose of detecting any weapon that
might be used to harm him. Once again the Court justified the warrant-
less "search" (frisk) on the presence of exigent circumstances."1
108. Id. at 762-763. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
109. Cf. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58 (1967).
110. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Supreme Court
held that a warrant, issued by the State's Attorney General for the search and seizure
of the petitioner's automobile did not satisfy the requirements of the fourth amend-
men as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth because it was not issued by
a "neutral and detached magistrate." Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of
the Court: "We find no escape from the conclusion that the seizure and search of
the Pontiac automobile cannot constitutionally rest upon the warrant issued by the
state official who was the chief investigator and prosecutor in this case. Since he
was not the neutral and detached magistrate required by the Constitution, the
search stands on no firmer ground than if there had been no warrant at all." 403
U.S. at 452. This holding only emphasizes the importance the Supreme Court at-
taches to the mandatory warrant requirement in searches for criminal evidence.
111. Intrusions other than a warrantless physical search in a suspect's home for
criminal evidence. Intrusions such as: automobile searches, street searches, elec-
tronic surveillance, and administrative searches.
112. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Peters
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
113. It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court does not distinguish a
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We do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, ob-
tain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant pro-
cedure. . . But we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct-necessarily
swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-
which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to
the warrant procedure. 14
Therefore, the rationale of "stop and frisk" is modeled on the "exigency"
foundation of the "search incident to a valid arrest" exception to the
search warrant requirement.
In Katz v. United States,'" the Supreme Court did not make all elec-
tronic eavesdropping impermissible. Appropriate judicial supervision can
authorize the limited use of electronic surveillance.
It is apparant that the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the inescapable
fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial
officer. They were not required, before commencing the search, to present their es-
timate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They were
not compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise limits es-
tablished in advance by a specific court order. Nor were they directed, after the
search had been completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that
had been seized. In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained
a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of
a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive
means consistent with that end. Searches conducted without warrants have been
held unlawful 'notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause.' 1 16
"frisk" from a search under the meaning of the fourth amendment: "It must be rec-
ognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his free-
dom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person. And it is nothing less than sheer
torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer
surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find
weapons is not a 'search'." Id. at 16.
114. 392 U.S. at 20. (emphasis added).
115. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See Osborn v. United'States, 385 U.S. 323 (1967);
Nardone'v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) and 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Benanti
V. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957); Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952),
overruled, Lee v. Florida, 391 U.S. 378 (1968). See generally Federal Communi-
cations Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(1)-2516(2) (1970).
116. 389 U.S. at 356-357. In Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), the
Supreme Court held that the language of a New York statute authorizing official
electronic eavesdropping was too broad in its sweep and therefore was violative of
the fourth and fourteenth amendments. Under this statute eavesdropping was au-
thorized without requiring identification of the conversations to be "seized" or of
the specific crimes involved. Secondly, the statute authorized eavesdropping for
periods of two months. Also, the statute provided for no termination date.
Finally, the statute did not require notice as search warrants traditionally do. Id.
at 58-60. Mr. Justice Clark stated: "The Fourth Amendment commands that a war-
rant issue not only upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, but also
'particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.' New York's statute lacks this particularization. It merely says that a war-
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Thus, judicial supervision is a precondition for valid electronic eaves-
dropping.
Although the foregoing cases have generally concerned themselves with
searches for criminal evidence there is authority for the premise that ad-
ministrative searches also require some sort of judicial authorization to
meet the test of reasonableness. However, the limits of this judicial au-
thorization have not been precisely defined. In District of Columbia v.
Little," I 7 Judge Prettyman stated the general rule:
We emphasize that no matter who the officer is or what his mission, a governmental
official cannot invade a private home, unless (1) a magistrate has authorized him to
do so or (2) an immediate major crisis in the performance of duty afford neither
time nor opportunity to apply to a magistrate. This right of privacy is not con-
ditioned upon the objective, the prerogative or the stature of the intruding officer.118
Administrative searches can be distinguished from "automobile searches"
and "street searches" in that they involve an invasion of the home. Be-
cause of the intrusion into the home, the same mandatory search warrant
procedure that is required in criminal searches of the home has been
adopted as a standard for administrative searches. 1)
rant may issue on reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be ob-
tained by the eavesdrop. It lays down no requirement for particularity .. "
388 U.S. at 55-56. See N.Y. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 813(A) (1942);
Clinton v. Virginia, 204 Va. 275, 130 S.E. 2d 437 (1963), rev'd per curiam, 377
U.S. 158 (1964). See generally Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S.
205 (1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
117. 178 F.2d 13 (1950), aj'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
118. Id. at 17. Judge Prettyman also states how the reasonableness of a search
is to be determined. "When the Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches, it, of
course, by implication, permits reasonable searches. But reasonableness without
a warrant is adjudged solely by the extremity of the circumstances of the moment
and not by any general characteristic of the officer or his mission." 178 F.2d at
16. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967); Frank v. Maryland,
359 U.S. 360, 380 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting), overruled, Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). For a discussion of the probable cause necessary
to secure a warrant for an administrative search, See Lafave, Administrative Searches
and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, S. CT. REv. 1, 11-20
(1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 547-548 (Clark, Harlan and
Stewart, J.J., dissenting).
119. In United States v. Duffy, 282 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the district
court held that where special investigators of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Divi-
sion of I.R.S. seized liquor bottles at the defendant's bar and acted within specific
statutory authority, there was no violation of the defendant's fourth amendment
rights. The court distinguished this case from Camara and See on the basis that
bars must be licensed by the state. "I venture the opinion that Camara and See
would not apply to the case at bar. No apartment residence is here involved, as in
Camara, nor locked commercial warehouse, as in See. It may also be noted as of
importance that defendant must have a license for his bar under the law of New
York .. .that his 'retail licensed premises' are 'subject to inspection' by state offi-
cers whenever open for business .. " 282 F. Supp. at 780.
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In See v. City of Seattle,'120 the Supreme Court held that under the
fourth and fourteenth amendments, a defendant could not be prosecuted
for exercising his constitutional right to insist that a fire inspector obtain
a search warrant authorizing entry upon the defendant's locked ware-
house. To establish the necessity of securing a search warrant for enter-
ing a commercial warehouse, Mr. Justice White compared the present
case to cases in which an administrative subpoena was used:
We find strong support in these subpoena cases for our conclusion that warrants are
a necessary and a tolerable limitation on the right to enter upon and inspect com-
mercial premises.
It is now settled that, when an administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or
records, the Fourth Amendment requires that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in
scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be
unreasonably burdensome. The agency has the right to conduct all reasonable in-
spections of such documents which are contemplated by statute, but it must delimit
the confines of a search by designating the needed documents in a formal subpoena.
In addition, while the demand to inspect may be issued by the agency, in the form
of an administrative subpoena, it may not be made and enforced by the inspector in
the field, and the subpoenaed party may obtain judicial review of the reasonableness
of the demand prior to suffering penalties for refusing to comply.
It is these rather minimal limitations on administrative action which we think are
constitutionally required in the case of investigative entry upon commercial estab-
lishments ...
We therefore conclude that administrative entry, without consent, upon portions of
commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be compelled
through prosecution or physical force within the framework of the warrant proced-
ure.
121
In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), the Supreme
Court held that under statutes conferring broad authority to the Secretary of the
Treasury to enter and inspect premises of retail liquor dealers (and providing for
a forfeiture of $500 for refusal to permit the inspection) an imposition of the fine
was the exclusive remedy and inspectors could not break and enter a locked store-
room without a search warrant. Mr. Justice Douglas stated: "What was said in
See reflects this Nation's traditions that are strongly opposed to using force with-
out definite authority to break down doors. We deal here with the liquor industry
long subject to close supervision and inspection . . . [B]ut under the existing
statutes, Congress selected a standard that does not include forcible entries without
a warrant." 397 U.S. at 77. See James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935, 946
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) for a discussion of the difference between Colonnade and the
present case, Wyman. See generally Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa 36, 126 N.W.
914 (1910).
120. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
121. Id. at 544-545. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632,
652-653 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-209
(1946); United States v. Baush and Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 727-728
(1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). See generally United States v.
Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952).
In Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), the Supreme Court held that
immigration officers could seize criminal evidence that they encountered during a
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It would appear then that in this limited area, the court feels that some
form of due process is necessary to make a search reasonable.
The lower federal court in James v. Goldberg, also indicated that prior
judicial supervision of the welfare home visit was required to make this
investigatory technique a reasonable search under the fourth amendment.
The court stated:
This Court cannot with deference to the Fourth Amendment excuse the ab-
sence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the
Constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation make the course impera-
tive. . . Should any of these factors or other circumstances or evidence indicate
the propriety of or necessity for the search of private property in a particular case,
application may be made to an appropriate judicial officer who, utilizing the standard
of 'probable cause' will test the particular decision to search against the constitu-
tional mandate of reasonableness. Should this official determine that a valid pub-
lic interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there exists probable cause to
issue a suitably restricted search warrant.' 22
Therefore, the relevant test to determine the reasonableness of a search
even where the circumstances are not criminal in nature, seems to be
whether or not prior "judicial sanction" was obtained.
proper search of defendant's premises without a search warrant, following his arrest
under an administrative deportation warrant.
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, stated: "The opening wedge that broadened the
power of administrative officers--as distinguished from police-to enter and
search peoples' homes was Frank v. Maryland . . . . That case allowed a health in-
spector to enter a home without a warrant, even though he had ample time to get
one. The officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.) are now
added to the preferred list. They are preferred because their duties, being strictly
administrative, put them in a separate category from those who enforce the criminal
law." 362 U.S. at 242 (Douglas and Black, J.J., dissenting).
In Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University, 284 F. Supp.
725 (M.D. Ala. 1968) the district court held that the state university regulation
in which the college reserved the right to enter rooms to inspect was not violative
of the fourth amendment rights of the students because it was essential to the
running of the school as an educational institution.
122. James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935, 943-944 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The
Court also points out that there is no validity in trying to distinguish between a
search and a welfare home visit.
"To attempt to draw a distinction regarding the applicability of the (Fourth)
Amendment dependent upon whether the caseworker intends to counsel the recipient
as to how best to utilize his limited resources or to look for evidence of fraud, would
invite a trial of every official's purpose-a task which would undoubtedly pervert
the intent of the amendment. There exists no valid reason for varying the protec-
tion afforded by the Amendment even assuming that the home visit is an effort to
deal with a purely 'social problem'." 303 F. Supp. at 942. For similar rejections
of attempted distinctions between searches and health inspections, See District of
Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1950), a!f'd on other grounds, 339
U.S. 1 (1950), McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948). See gen-
erally, Note, Law of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Applied To Health In-
spection, 44 ILL. L. REV. 845 (1950).
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However, in Wyman, Mr. Justice Blackmun returned to Rabinowitz
which held that the relevant test is whether the search itself was reason-
able, rather than whether it was practicable to secure a search warrant:
If however, we were to assume that a caseworker's home visit, before or subsequent
to the beneficiary's initial qualification for benefits, somehow (perhaps because the
average beneficiary might feel she is in no position to refuse consent to the visit),
and despite its interview nature, does possess some of the characteristics of a search
in the traditional sense, we nevertheless conclude that the visit does not fall within
the Fourth Amendment's proscription. This is because it does not descend to the
level of unreasonableness. It is unreasonableness which is the Fourth Amendment's
standard.128
The majority seems to ignore the purpose of the test for reasonableness
delineated in Chimel. Judicial supervision of any invasion of a person's
right of privacy is always preferred over the judgment of the law enforce-
ment officer because it is "neutral and detached." The judgment of the
governmental officer, who is engaged in the "competitive business of fer-
reting out crime," is not impartial. Thus, the Supreme Court revives the
old test of Rabinowitz to justify the failure of the New York welfare agency
to secure valid search warrants before making a demand to enter the
home to conduct the home visit.
Justice Douglas raises the obvious objection to the majority holding:
The applicable principle, as stated in Camara as 'justified by history and by
current experience' is that 'except in certain carefully defined classes of cases,' a
search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been
authorized by a valid search warrant. . . . [If inspectors want to enter the precincts
of the home against the wishes of the lady of the house, they must get a warrant.
The need for exigent action as in cases of 'hot pursuit' is not present for the lady
will not disappear; nor will the baby. 124
123. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971). Mr. Justice Blackmun then
recites eleven reasons that indicate why the home visit is not unreasonable: (1)
The focus of public aid is on the child; (2) because the state welfare agencies
are fulfilling a public trust, they have valid concern in seeing that the tax money
benefits the proper aid recipients; (3) like an individual that dispenses private
charity, the public has the same obligation to see that its funds are used prop-
erly; (4) the emphasis of the federal and New York statutes is on "close contact
with the beneficiary;" (5) the "home visit" has been recognized as "the heart of
welfare administration;" (6) the procedures of the "home visit" are designed to
protect the aid recipient's privacy; (7) the aid recipient, Mrs. James, presents no
complaint of an unreasonable search; (8) "collateral contacts" are not as efficient
in providing information to the welfare agency as the "home visit" is; (9) the
visit is not made by the police or uniformed authority; (10) the "home visit" is not
a search for criminal evidence; and (11) forcing the welfare agency to secure
a search warrant would result in more inequities to the aid recipient than he is
subjected to under the present procedure. 400 U.S. at 318-24.
124. Id. at 331. (Douglas, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Marshall raises the
same objection: "Of course, the Fourth Amendment test is reasonableness, but in
determining whether a search is reasonable, this Court is not free merely to balance,
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Thus, Mr. Justice Douglas felt that the Court could not justify the failure
of the New York state welfare agency to secure search warrants by re-
verting back to the Rabinowitz test of reasonableness. He felt that the
controlling standard was the Chimel test. Under that standard, except in
a very limited number of circumstances based on the presence of "exi-
gency," a search warrant had to be obtained for any invasion of an
individual's right of privacy or the search was unreasonable per se. The
home visit in Wyman involved no exigent circumstances. The state
welfare agency had adequate time to procure a valid search warrant
because the aid recipient or her child would not leave or disappear.
Therefore, Mr. Justice Douglas felt that the home visit in Wyman should
have been adjudicated unreasonable per se."25
In addition to the fundamental disagreement among the Supreme Court
Justices as to whether the home visit is a search, or if it is a search, wheth-
er it is unreasonable, the holding in Wyman raises one final, important
question. May the State condition the initial and continuing receipt of
AFDC benefits upon a waiver of rights embodied in the fourth amend-
ment?
In Barsky v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of New
York, 126 the Supreme Court held that due process of law does not apply to
a physician whose state license had been suspended without a hearing be-
cause of his conviction in federal court of a misdemeanor. Mr. Justice
Burton asserted: "The practice of medicine in New York is lawfully pro-
hibited by the State except upon the conditions it imposes. Such practice
is a privilege granted by the State under its substantially plenary power to
fix the terms of admission.' 27 The Court held that due process of law is
not applicable unless an individual is being deprived of a right. It ad-
judged the state medical license to be a privilege. Therefore, constitu-
tional protections were not to be invoked when only a privilege was taken
away.
in a totally ad hoc fashion, any number of subjective factors. An unbroken line
of cases holds that, subject to a few narrowly drawn exceptions, any search without
a warrant is constitutionally unreasonable .... In this case, no suggestion that evi-
dence will disappear, that a criminal will escape, or that an officer will be injured,justifies the failure to obtain a warrant." 400 U.S. at 341. (Marshall and Bren-
nan, J.J., dissenting).
125. It should be noted that the federal appeals court, in United States v.
Rickenbacker, 309 F.2d 462, (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 962 (1963),
held that penal sanctions for refusal to answer census questions, authorized by 13
U.S.C. § 221(a) (1964), did not violate the fourth amendment rights of the de-
fendant.
126. 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
127. Id. at 451.
1116 [Vol. XXI
1972] CASE NOTES 1117
In Flemming v. Nestor,128 the Supreme Court refused to apply due
process of law to the decision of the Secretary of HEW to terminate,
without a hearing, the old age insurance benefits of a deported alien who
had become eligible under the Social Security Act. In designating the
old age insurance benefits to be a privilege, Mr. Justice Harlan stated:
"We must conclude that a person covered by the Act has not such a right
in benefit payments as would make every defeasance of 'accrued' inter-
ests violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' 29
Therefore, the Court held that Social Security benefits were a privilege,
not a right. Under this decision an individual could not invoke the Con-
stitutional protection of due process when these benefits are taken
away.' 30
In Speiser v. Randall,13' the Supreme Court held that a provision of a
state constitution, making nonadvocacy of overthrow of the government
by unlawful means a condition precedent to a tax exemption, was violative
of the first amendment. Mr. Justice Douglas asserted:
It cannot be gainsaid that a discriminatory denial of a tax exemption for engaging
in speech is a limitation on free speech. . . . (But) To deny an exemption to
claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for
such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to fine them for
this speech.1 3
2
Therefore, the Court held that the state could not condition the granting
of a tax exemption on an individual's waiver of his first amendment
rights.' 33
128. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
129. Id. at 611.
130. Cf. Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial Hospital Comm'n, 397 F.2d
33 (6th Cir. 1968); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Dixon v.
Alabama Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); Smith v. Reynolds,
277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir.
1961). Contra, Goliday v. Robinson, 305 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Ill. 1969). The
District Court held that the state public aid statutes, relating to reduction, suspen-
sion, or termination of aid were in violation of the due process of law clause of the
fourteenth amendment because they did not require notice or a hearing.
The court stated: "We reach this conclusion by way of our finding that if it is
necessary to cast the matter of (the receipt of) public aid .. . to the needy in one
or the other of the long-labored-with molds of privileges or rights, we must classify
it as a right...." 305 F.Supp. at 1226. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733 (1964); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Evidentiary
Hearing Required Prior to Termination of Welfare Benefits, 19 DEPAUL L. REV.
552 (1970).
131. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
132. Id. at 518. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
133. In Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946), the Supreme Court held
that, while second-class mail rates could be granted or withheld by the Postmaster,
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In Sherbert v. Verner,13 4 the Court held that a state could not constitu-
tionally apply the eligibility provisions of an unemployment statute in
such a manner as to deny benefits to a claimant, who had refused em-
ployment on Saturday because of her religious beliefs. Mr. Justice Bren-
nan asserted:
The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her reli-
gion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such
a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a
fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.
Nor may the South Carolina Court's construction of the statute be saved from
constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment compensation benefits are
not appellant's 'right' but merely a 'privilege.' It is too late in the day to doubt that
the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing
of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.' 35
Thus, the Court held that the state cannot precondition the continued
eligibility for unemployment compensation on a person's waiver of his
first amendment rights. This decision extends the holding of Speiser to
unemployment benefits, which the Court has designated as a privilege.
Admittedly, the holdings in Speiser and Sherbert are concerned with a
denial of first amendment rights generally considered to have a high pri-
ority within the constitutional framework; nevertheless, the decisions do
reveal that even where the benefits granted by the state or federal govern-
ment are considered a privilege the grantor may not predicate the receipt
of these benefits upon the waiver of certain "rights."
This trend was continued in Shapiro v. Thompson1' where the Su-
preme Court held that a state could not precondition initial eligibility for
welfare assistance on a one year residency requirement because it created
a classification that constituted an invidious discrimination, denying them
equal protection of the laws. Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our con-
stitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to
travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules,
or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement. . . . Thus, the
purpose of deterring the in-migration of indigents cannot serve as justification for
he could not grant the rates "on condition that certain economic or political ideas
not be disseminated." 327 U.S. at 146. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
134. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
135. id. at 404. In United States v. Chicago, 282 U.S. 311 (1931), Mr. Justice
Sutherland stated: "Broadly stated, the rule is that the right to continue the exer-
cise of a privilege granted by the state cannot be made to depend upon the
grantee's submission to a condition prescribed by the state which is hostile to the
provisions of the federal Constitution." Id. at 328-329.
136. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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the classification created by the one-year waiting period, since that purpose is con-
stitutionally impermissible. If a law has 'no other purpose . . . than to chill the as-
sertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then
it (is) patently unconstitutional. 1 3 7
In this decision, the Court has extended the doctrine of Speiser and
Sherbert to another "privilege," AFDC assistance. Therefore, a state
may not set up some arbitrary classification as a mandatory prerequisite
for initial eligibility for the receipt of social welfare assistance. Although
the right to unhindered travel throughout the United States involves a
constitutional right other than the fourth amendment, it would seem logi-
cal that the protections of the fourth amendment would also apply to a
state's attempt to condition initial eligibility for AFDC benefits on some
arbitrary classification of aid recipients.
In the Parrish case,' 3 8 the state supreme court applied the protections
of the fourth amendment to early morning mass raids to determine con-
tinued welfare eligibility:
Our case proceeds far beyond a mere request for admission presented by authorities
under color of office. Thus we need not determine here whether a request for entry,
voiced by one in a position of authority under circumstances which suggest that
some official reprisal might attend a refusal, is itself sufficient to vitiate an affirma-
tive response by an individual who had not been apprised of his Fourth Amendment
rights. The person subjected to the instant operation confronted far more than the
amorphous threat of official displeasure which necessarily attends any such request.
The request for entry by persons whom the beneficiaries knew to possess virtually
unlimited power over their very livelihood posed a threat which was far more cer-
137. Id. at 629, 631. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
See generally Gardner v. Broderick, 392'U.S. 273, 279 (1968); Garrity v. New Jer-
sey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967). Cf. United
States v. Chikata, 427 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1970). Mr. Jackson also states: "This
constitutional challenge cannot be answered by the argument that public assistance
benefits are a 'privilege' and not a 'right.'" Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at
627 n.6 (1969).
In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) the Supreme Court held that procedural
due process requires that pretermination evidentiary hearings be held when public
assistance payments to the welfare recipient are stopped. In reaffirming Sherbert and
Speiser Mr. Justice Brennan asserted: "Relevant constitutional restraints apply as
much to the withdrawal of public assistance benefits as to disqualification for un-
employment compensation." 397 U.S. at 262. See Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Londoner v.
Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908) for cases concerned with the "balancing of in-
terests" test. Cf. In Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. Mc-
Elroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), the Supreme Court held that the action of a com-
mander of a military installation in summarily denying a civilian employee access
to the installation which was the location of her employment, for security reasons,
did not violate the requirements of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
138. Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n of County of Alameda, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d
260, 425 P.2d 223 (1967).
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tain, immediate, and substantial. These circumstances nullify the legal effectiveness
of the apparent consent secured by the Alameda County searchers. Both this Court
and the Supreme Court of the United States have recently emphasized the heavy bur-
den which the government bears when it seeks to rely upon a supposed waiver of
constitutional rights. The county has not sustained the burden here.' 3 9
The lower federal court in Wyman also followed this trend:
Even if we assume that AFDC grants are a privilege or governmental gratuity, the
power of government to decline to extend these benefits to its citizens does not em-
brace the supposedly 'lesser' power to condition the receipt of those benefits upon any
and all terms. . . . For to deny plaintiff even a gratuitous benefit because of the
exercise of a constitutional right effectively impedes the exercise of that right.1 40
Therefore, the evident trend in the courts has been to refuse to allow a
state to condition the granting of a privilege upon a waiver of an indi-
vidual's constitutional rights. 14'
Once again, the Supreme Court refused to follow the developing trend
in the lower courts. It is implicit in the majority holding in Wyman that
139. Id. at 269-270, 425 P. 2d at 229-230, Charles Reich states: "[Tihere is
no theory under which it can be said that public assistance recipients consent, ex-
pressly or impliedly, to searches of their homes. The official demand for en-
trance is sufficient to render any apparent consent involuntary and the threat of loss
of public assistance underscores the coercive nature of the demand for entry."
Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347,
1350 (1963). See French, Comment: Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis,
50 GEO. L. J. 234, 236-239 (1961); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare
Benefits With Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966); Note, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960). See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S.
1 (1966); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 486 (1960); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Pekar v. United
States, 315 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1963); Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217
(9th Cir. 1960); Canida v. United States, 250 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1958); Judd v.
United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951). These cases will indicate
that the Courts generally deny the validity of coerced consent. See generally
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-476 (1966).
140. James v. Goldberg, 303 F.Supp. 935, 942 (S.D. N.Y. 1969). Cf. in
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Supreme Court held that a state
Public Welfare regulation placing an absolute limit of $250.00 per month on the
amount of the grant under AFDC regardless of the size of the family and its actual
need, did not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Mr. Justice Stewart stated: "Under this long-established meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause, it is clear that the Maryland maximum grant regulation is con-
stitutionally valid. . . . It is enough that a solid foundation for the regulation
can be found in the State's legitimate interest in encouraging employment and in
avoiding discrimination between welfare families and the families of the working
poor. By combining a limit on the recipient's grant with permission to retain
money earned, without reduction in the amount of the grant, Maryland provides an
incentive to seek gainful employment." 397 U.S. at 486.
141. This trend has been based on the "balance of the interest test." The
results of the test have usually been in favor of the individual as against the gov-
ernment. But see Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886 (1961).
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even if the home visit is an unreasonable search, the appellee cannot con-
stitutionally object because AFDC benefits are a privilege, not a right.
Mr. Justice Blackmun states:
The agency, with tax funds provided from federal as well as from state sources, is
fulfilling a public trust. The State, working through its qualified welfare agency, has
appropriate and paramount interest and concern in seeing and assuring that the in-
tended and proper objects of that tax-produced assistance are the ones who benefit
from the aid it dispenses. Surely it is not unreasonable, in the Fourth Amendment
sense or in any other sense of that term, that the State have at its command a gentle
means, of limited extent and of practical and considerate application, of achieving
that assurance.
One who dispenses purely private charity naturally has an interest in and expects
to know how his charitable funds are utilized and put to work. The public, when it
is the provider, rightly expects the same. It might well expect more, because of the
trust aspect of public funds, and the recipient, as well as the case worker, has not
only an interest but an obligation. 14 2
By the use of this language, the Court apparently resurrects the "right-
privilege" distinction in the area of social welfare assistance. 143
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, strongly objects to this part of the
majority opinion:
There is not the slightest hint in See that the Government could condition a busi-
ness license on the 'consent' of the licensee to the administrative searches we held
violated the Fourth Amendment. It is a strange jurisprudence indeed which safe-
guards the businessman at his place of work from warrantless searches but will not
do the same for a mother in her home. Is a search of her home without a warrant
made 'reasonable' merely because she is dependent on government largesse? . . . If
the welfare recipient was not Barbara James but a prominent, affluent cotton or
wheat farmer receiving benefit payments for not growing crops, would not the ap-
proach be different? Welfare in aid of dependent children, like social security and
unemployment benefits, has an aura of suspicion. . . . But constitutional rights-
here the privacy of the home-are obviously not dependent on the poverty or on the
affluence of the beneficiary. It is the precincts of the home that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects; and their privacy is as important to the lowly as to the mighty.
14 4
142. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1971). (emphasis added).
143. Supra notes 126, 128.
144. 400 U.S. 309, 331-33 (1971). See Jones, The Rule of Law and the Wel-
fare State, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 143, 154-155 (1958).
Mr. Justice Marshall asserts similar objections in Wyman: "Appellants offer a
third state interest which the Court seems to accept as partial justification for this
search. We are told that the visit is designed to rehabilitate, to provide aid. This
is strange doctrine indeed. A paternalistic notion that a complaining citizen's con-
stitutional rights can be violated so long as the State is somehow helping him is
alien to our Nation's philosophy. . . . Had the Court squarely faced the question of
whether the State can condition welfare payments on the waiver of clear constitu-
tional rights, the answer would be plain. The decisions of this Court do not support
the notion that a State can use welfare benefits as a wedge to coerce 'waiver' of
Fourth Amendment rights ...... 400 U.S. 309, 343-44 (1971).
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The objections of the dissenting Justices are well founded. In the fu-
ture will aid recipients have to waive more of their constitutional rights in
order to remain eligible for continued welfare benefits from the Govern-
ment? As long ago as 1928, Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out the dan-
gers to constitutional freedom present in this type of reasoning: "[E]x-
perience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when
the government's purposes are beneficent.' 45
Robert D. Shearer, Jr.
145. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
